Retroactivity in the 1970 UNESCO Convention:  Cases of the United States and Australia by Januszkiewicz, Katarzyna
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 41 | Issue 1 Article 7
2015
Retroactivity in the 1970 UNESCO Convention:
Cases of the United States and Australia
Katarzyna Januszkiewicz
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the
Other Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Katarzyna Januszkiewicz, Retroactivity in the 1970 UNESCO Convention: Cases of the United States and Australia, 41 Brook. J. Int'l L.
(2015).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol41/iss1/7
RETROACTIVITY IN THE 1970 UNESCO
CONVENTION: CASES OF THE UNITED
STATES AND AUSTRALIA
INTRODUCTION
n September 5, 2014, Australia announced that it would
return a nine hundred-year-old bronze statue of the god
Shiva to its home country of India.1 The statue was purchased
for $5.6 million AUD and was returned along with a stone
statue of Shiva with Nandi, which was purchased for $300,000
AUD, by Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott during his
visit to India.2 The National Gallery of Australia acquired the
statues from the now infamous Subhash Kapoor, an Indian-
born New York-based antiquities dealer charged with organiz-
ing a $100 million USD smuggling ring.3 The Shiva Nataraja
was illegally removed from the Hindu temple at Tamil Nadu
and was among the items Kapoor admitted to illegally export-
ing out of India after their removal.4 Australia’s willingness to
1. This “dancing Shiva,” also known as the “Shiva Nataraja” statue, dates
to the Chola dynasty and was in the possession of the National Gallery of
Australia (“National Gallery”) since its purchase in 2008. India requested the
return of this artifact in March 2014 under the United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) agreement regarding sto-
len artworks. See Latika Bourke, Dancing Shiva to be Returned During Ab-
bott’s India Visit, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 5, 2014),
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/dancing-shiva-to-be-
returned-during-abbotts-india-visit-20140904-10cqvy.html.
2. India and Australia have had a strained relationship since 2007, when
the Australian government decided to stop the sale of uranium to India.
Bourke, supra note 1. Tony Abbott’s trip partially intended to improve Aus-
tralia-India relations. See Gabrielle Chan, Stolen Indian Statue, Shiva Nata-
raja, to go Home During Tony Abbott Visit, GUARDIAN (Sept. 4, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/05/stolen-indian-statue-shiva-
nataraja-to-go-home-during-tony-abbott-visit.
3. See Abby Seiff, Looted Beauty, A.B.A. J., July 2014, at 35, 41.
4. Kapoor claimed that a diplomat’s wife sold the pieces to him. Australia
Set to return Ancient Statues to India, KHALEEJ TIMES (Mar. 27, 2914),
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/article/20140327/ARTICLE/303279924/1028.
Among the stolen items listed was the Shiva Nataraja statue. See Chan, su-
pra note 2. Authorities in India issued a warrant for Kapoor’s arrest in Octo-
ber 2011. At that time, Kapoor was visiting an exhibition in Frankfurt, Ger-
many, where he was ultimately arrested and extradited to India. See Tom
Mashberf & Max Bearak, The Ultimate Temple Raider?, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
2015, at AR1. Since his extradition, Kapoor has awaited trial in a prison in
O
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return the Shiva to India is just one illustration of the recent
trend of governments and museums cooperating with source
nations in returning illegally exported artifacts.5 Until recent-
ly, such cordial exchanges were a rarity.
Chennai, India for two criminal cases pending against him. Id. On September
4, 2015, the Madras High Court rejected Kapoor’s fourth bail plea application
explaining that since his bail had already been previously extended, “it would
result in prolongation of the trial as there is every likelihood of his fleeing
from the clutches of law.” Bail Please of Idol Smuggler Subhash Kapoor Re-
jected, NEW INDIAN EXPRESS (Sept. 4, 2015),
http://www.newindianexpress.com/states/tamil_nadu/Bail-Plea-of-Idol-
smuggler-Subhash-Kapoor-rejected/2015/09/04/article3009680.ece. Kapoor is
facing the maximum sentence of fourteen years for smuggling antiquities.
Rachel Kleinman & Amrit Dhillon, The National gallery of Australia Dances
Into Trouble with Shiva, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 18, 2014),
http://www.smh.com.au/national/the-national-gallery-of-australia-dances-
into-trouble-with-shiva-20140317-34xui.html. As for the National Gallery of
Australia, it claimed no knowledge of Kapoor’s illicit activity and maintained
that during the negotiations to purchase the Shiva Natajara the Gallery
“carefully checked all known art registers [and] determined that the work
was of appropriate quality for the collection and independently verified its
previous owners.” See NAT’L GALLERY OF AUSTL., ANNUAL REPORT 2013–14, at
17–18, http://nga.gov.au/AboutUs/Reports/NGA_AR_13-14.pdf. Furthermore,
“independent art experts were consulted and specialist legal advice was
sought” before the purchase was completed. Id. Just how in-depth all this
research was remains speculative since galleries are known to turn their eye
when it comes to purchases of highly desirable objects. Nonetheless, the Na-
tional Gallery decried its luck and stated that “[m]any institutions across the
world are in a similar situation.” Id. Yet, the National Gallery was very re-
luctant to admit that the statue may have been acquired through illegal
means. See Andrew Taylor, National Gallery of Australia Director Ron Rad-
ford Reluctant to Admit Dancing Shiva is Stolen, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/art-and-
design/national-gallery-of-australia-director-ron-radford-reluctant-to-admit-
dancing-shiva-is-stolen-20140406-366mx.html. For more information about
the removal of the Shiva statue, see Michaela Boland and Amanda Hodge,
Town Prays for its Stolen God Shiva to Return, AUSTRALIAN (Mar. 8, 2014),
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/arts/town-prays-for-its-stolen-god-shiva-to-
return/story-e6frg8n6-1226848649572.
5. As a result of this scandal, the National Gallery announced on Decem-
ber 14, 2014, that it was independently reviewing its Asian art collection to
address any provenance issues. See December Media Releases, Nat’l Gallery
of Austl., National Gallery of Australia Establishes Independent Review of
Asian Art Collection (Dec. 19, 2014), available at
http://nga.gov.au/AboutUs/press/Archive/Archiv14.cfm. The collection fea-
tures some five thousand pieces, and so far fifty-four have been shown to re-
quire further information and documentation. Id. This in turn prompted the
Australian government to review the Protection of Movable Cultural Herit-
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Millions of patrons visit the world’s museums every year.6
While strolling through grand halls filled with exquisite pieces
of art, one rarely stops to think about how these objects made
their way to what they now call home. However, the dirty se-
cret of museum collecting is gradually seeping out into the in-
ternational public sphere.7 This secret is the acquisition and
incorporation of stolen and looted artifacts into museum collec-
tions—a practice as old as the very institution of the museum
itself. 8 But institutions are not the only ones making such
deals; private collections are ripe with artifacts lacking prove-
age Act (PMCHA), which has not been updated since 1986. See Australian
Associated Press, National Gallery’s Stolen Shiva Prompts Review of Import
and Export Laws, GUARDIAN (Dec. 23, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2014/dec/23/import-export-
cultural-objects-acquisition-scandals-shiva.
6. The British Museum in London reports a record of 6.7 million visitors
for 2013. See British Museum, British Museum has Record Year of 6.7 Million
Visitors in 2013, BRITISH MUSEUM,
http://www.britishmuseum.org/about_us/news_and_press/press_releases/2014
/record_visitor_figures.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2015). The Metropolitan
Museum of Art in New York (the “Met”) boasted of 6.2 million visitors for
fiscal year 2013, the first year the Met was open seven days a week to the
public. See Metropolitan Museum of Art, Metropolitan Museum Announces 6.2
Million Annual Attendance, METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART (July 25, 2014),
http://www.metmuseum.org/about-the-museum/press-room/news/2014/met-
attendance-fy-2014. In addition, three of its special exhibitions in 2013 are
estimated to have generated some $742 million for New York, ensuring the
Met’s status as a powerhouse institution in the City. See Three Metropolitan
Museum Exhibitions Stimulate $742 Million 2013 Economic Impact for New
York, METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART (Oct. 7, 2013),
http://www.metmuseum.org/about-the-museum/press-
room/news/2013/economic-impact-release-october-2013.
7. One of the most publicized museum scandals in recent history involved
the Getty Museum and the arrest and criminal prosecution of its then curator
Marion True who conspired to purchase illegally obtained Italian antiquities
for the museum. See Elisabetta Povoledo, Rome Trial of Ex-Getty Curator
Ends, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/14/arts/design/14true.html.
8. See generally REINVENTING THE MUSEUM: HISTORICAL AND
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE PARADIGM SHIFT (Gail Anderson ed.,
2004) (discussing museum collecting practices and their evolution in response
to the modern viewer). The illicit antiquities market seems to predate ancient
Greece itself, and looting has always been closely intertwined with wartime.
See NEIL BRODIE, JENNY DOOLE AND PETER WATSON, STEALING HISTORY: THE
ILLICIT TRADE IN CULTURALMATERIAL 8–25 (2000).
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nance, which are purchased at extravagant prices.9 Illicit art
dealing has grown into an extremely lucrative business,
amounting to millions of dollars each year.10 Some experts have
speculated “[I]n monetary terms, the illicit art trade is second
only to the narcotics business.”11 Therefore, it is not surprising
that looted artifacts continue to flood the antiquities market
especially since many war-torn nations, such as Syria and Af-
ghanistan,12 are unable to protect their artifacts from being sto-
9. The Boston Museum of Fine Arts (“MFA”) recently returned a number
of Nigerian artifacts after an inquiry into their provenance showed that they
were in fact stolen or looted. Many of these pieces were bequeathed to the
MFA by William Teel after his death in 2012. An investigation into these
pieces as well as others donated by Teel to the MFA, revealed that although
many had a clear title, there were a number that did not. Jason Felch, Boston
MFA’s Provenance Research Reveals the Illicit Trade in African Art, CHASING
APHRODITE BLOG (July 30, 2014),
http://chasingaphrodite.com/2014/07/30/boston-mfas-provenance-research-
reveals-the-illicit-trade-in-african-antiquities/. While the MFA’s project is a
commendable effort, it has not been widely adopted and the MFA itself con-
tinues to mend the mistakes of its collecting past. See Donna Yates, Novem-
ber Collection of Maya Pottery, TRAFFICKING CULTURE
http://traffickingculture.org/encyclopedia/case-studies/november-collection-of-
maya-pottery/ (last updated June 11, 2014). For an extreme example of the
prices collectors are willing to pay for art, whether ancient or modern, one
can look to the collection of the late Adolph Alfred Taubman whose private
collection sold for $419.7 million USD on November 6, 2015 at Sotheby’s.
James Tarmy, One Man’s Art Collection Just Sold for (only) $420 Million,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-
06/sotheby-s-a-alfred-taubman-sale-top-10-lots-results. Taubman’s collection
includes ancient art as well as the works of Rothko, Picasso, and de Kooning
to name a few. See Andrew Buncombe, Adolph Alfred Taubman: $500M Pri-
vate Art Collection of US Tycoon to be Sold at Auction, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 4,
2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/adolph-alfred-
taubman-500m-private-art-collection-of-us-tycoon-to-be-sold-at-auction-
10487203.html.
10. In 2013, Subhash Kapoor’s sister Sareen was charged with four counts
of criminal possession of stolen property for hiding four bronze statues of
Hindu gods. The statues were estimated to be worth $14.5 million. Bruce
Zagaris, U.S. and Australia Cooperate with India on the Kapoor Case on In-
dian Artifacts, 30 INT’L L. ENFORCEMENT REP., no. 1, 2014, at para. 1. U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement have referred to Subhash Kapoor
and his circle of accomplices been as “one of the most prolific commodities
smugglers in the world today.” Seiff, supra note 3, at 67.
11. Amy Bitterman, Settling Cultural Property Disputes, 19 VILL. SPORTS
&ENT. L. J. 1, 5 (2012).
12. Many civilian victims of the conflict in the Middle East find looting to
be an easy and lucrative way to make a living, but such practices are not lim-
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len. Additionally, the monetary incentives involved in smug-
gling cultural objects continue to promote this illegal traffick-
ing.13
Each year powerhouse museums such as The Metropolitan
Museum of Art in New York (“the Met”) and the British Muse-
um in London, receive repatriation requests from various coun-
tries struggling to reclaim their looted heritage.14 Many in-
ited to war-torn nations. Steve Schlackman, Using Drones to Combat Archae-
ological Looting, ART L.J. (Apr. 6, 2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-06/sotheby-s-a-alfred-
taubman-sale-top-10-lots-results Looted sites become sources of wealth for
locals and a contextual nightmare for academics due to problems with undoc-
umented provenance. See Afghanistan’s Looted and Lost Heritage, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 3, 2013),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/08/pictures/130802-
afghanistan-stolen-treasures-looting-archaeology-black-market/.
13. See Seiff, supra note 3, at 41. In Syria, the ravages of war have had
long-lasting effects not only on the people but also on the cultural heritage of
the region. Archaeologists, academics, and amateurs are working together to
document the damage to sites in Syria and promote a general awareness
worldwide regarding the plight of many Middle Eastern sites. See Ursula
Lindsey, Academics and Archaeologists Fight to Save Syria’s Artifacts, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 24, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/25/world/middleeast/academics-and-
archaeologists-fight-to-save-syrias-artifacts.html.
14. For the most recent example of cooperation between museums and
states in returning looted objects, see Metropolitan Museum of Art to Return
Two Khmer Sculptures to Cambodia, METROPOLITANMUSEUM OF ART (May 3,
2013), http://www.metmuseum.org/about-the-museum/press-
room/news/2013/cambodian-returns. Interestingly, since May 2013, the Met
has not released any news regarding any other items it intends to return in
the near future. For a general overview of how museums obtain illegally re-
moved objects, see Carl Franzen, Ill-gotten Gains: How Manu Museums Have
Stolen Objects in Their Collections?, VERGE (May 13, 2013),
http://www.theverge.com/2013/5/13/4326306/museum-artifacts-looted-
repatriation. According to the British Museum website, the last press release
to mention the repatriation of cultural artifacts was issued in March 2006.
See British Museum Decides to Return two Tasmanian Cremation Ash Bun-
dles, BRITISH MUSEUM (Mar. 24, 2006),
www.britishmuseum.org/about_us/news_and_press/press_releases/2006/tasm
anian_cremation_bundles.aspx. There were no published returns of artifacts
until July 2012, when the British Museum helped return smuggled artifacts
to the National Museum in Kabul. Stolen Artifacts Returned to the National
Museum of Afghanistan in Kabul, BRIT. MUSEUM,
http://www.britishmuseum.org/about_us/news_and_press/press_releases/2012
/stolen_artefacts_returned.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 2015). A reading of the
press releases on both museums’ websites makes it clear that acquisition of
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stances require formal litigation.15 But more and more, muse-
ums, private collectors, and countries of origin (nations from
where objects have been removed), which are seeking the resti-
tution of their artifacts, are working together on settlements or
deals that benefit all parties involved.16 This is a result of both
a shifting public opinion towards museums, and the growing
awareness of the value of looted cultural heritage by countries
of origin.17
This Note explores the domestic application of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property of 1970 (“UNESCO Convention” or “Convention”) by
both the United States and Australia. The currently growing
trend of returning looted artifacts to their countries of origin
highlights the need for stricter law enforcement procedures and
a possible reevaluation of the U.S. policy of the nonretroactive
presumably legally obtained objects occurs much more often than the repat-
riation of objects.
15. A highly publicized case was that of the J. Paul Getty Museum in Los
Angeles and its long battle with Italy over the return of a number of objects.
See Povoledo, supra note 7. The Italians brought their case against Marion
True, the then curator of antiquities for the Getty. Id. The suit lingered on for
over five years and ended with the Italian court ruling that the statute of
limitations on the alleged crimes had expired. Id. This is believed to be the
first instance of criminal charges being brought directly against a museum
curator. Id.
16. Such deals often involve an exchange of the item being returned for
other art loans in the future. See Seiff, supra note 3, at 37. A highly publi-
cized example is the return to Italy of the Euphronios Krater, a two thousand
five hundred-year-old Greek vase looted from an Italian tomb. See Eu-
phronios Krater, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/e/euphronios_kra
ter/index.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2015). The Met acquired the piece in
1972 for $1 million, which was especially valuable because only thirty pieces
made by Euphronios are known to have survived. Id.; see also Elisabetta Pov-
oledo, Ancient Vase Comes Home to a Hero’s Welcome, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/19/arts/design/19bowl.html. In addi-
tion to arranging for future loans to the Met, Italy agreed to not pursue legal
action. Seiff, supra note 3, at 37. Settlements like these are desirable not only
because they foster positive relationships between the parties and ensure
future cooperation, but also because litigation pertaining to cultural heritage
is usually complex, expensive, and often lengthy. Bitterman, supra note 11,
at 8–11.
17. Seiff, supra note 3, at 38.
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application of the UNESCO Convention, as applied to domestic
law. As a major market country, the United States can lead the
way in encouraging repatriation and in establishing better re-
lations with source countries that do not have the resources to
fight for their lost heritage on their own.
Part I of this Note discusses the adoption and ratification of
the UNESCO Convention and its impact on the cultural prop-
erty debate. Part I also discusses the United States’ adoption of
the UNESCO Convention through the enactment of the domes-
tic implementing legislation, the 1983 Convention of Cultural
Property Implementation Act (CPIA), as well as the earlier Na-
tional Stolen Property Act (NSPA) and their impact on Ameri-
can case law. Additionally, Part I examines Australia’s Protec-
tion of Movable Cultural Heritage Act of 1986 (PMCHA), Aus-
tralia’s equivalent of the CPIA, and compares both the adoption
and implementation of the UNESCO Convention by the United
States and Australia. Part II discusses the core issue of the ret-
roactive application of the UNESCO Convention and how it is
approached by the United States and Australia. Part III pro-
vides a resolution to the U.S. problem of retroactive application
by suggesting a middle-ground approach, which would allow a
smoother process for repatriation of objects under the
UNESCO Convention that may not be returned otherwise. By
applying the available instruments to repatriation requests
and requiring properly structured legislation applying the
UNESCO Convention, market nations will become better
equipped to work with many of the source nations currently
seeking to reestablish their cultural pasts. This approach will
also allow source nations that are parties to neither the
UNESCO Convention nor any bilateral agreements, such as
the U.S. Memoranda of Understanding, to participate in this
process, which is a key concern in the cultural heritage protec-
tion movement. Finally, this Note concludes with a summary of
the current situation and proposes a future resolution.
I. THE BIRTH OFMODERN CULTURALHERITAGE PROTECTION
The terms “cultural heritage” and “cultural property” conjure
up a myriad of meanings, each of which is highly contextually
dependent. These terms are interchangeable to some, while at
complete ends of the spectrum for others. For the purpose of
this Note, “cultural heritage” possesses a meaning deeply con-
nected to our very humanity. It is precious, limited, and in dire
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need of our protection. This Part will attempt to define “cultur-
al heritage” and explore how both domestic laws (U.S. and Aus-
tralian legislation implementing the UNESCO Convention)
and international measures (specifically international conven-
tions addressing these issues) try to cope with the growing
need for cultural restitution and repatriation.
A. Defining “Cultural Property”
Cultural heritage is so deeply intertwined in our understand-
ing of the world’s history and our perceptions of current socie-
ties that it is often taken for granted. Yet every society pos-
sesses an innate sense of the great value heritage holds be-
cause it is irreplaceable.18 Hence, it is only natural that cultur-
al heritage should be protected.19 But what constitutes cultural
heritage? The definition of cultural heritage in its broadest
meaning can be understood as “anything that is of cultural im-
portance, whether it be art, literature, music, archaeological
sites, sacred artifacts, historical artifacts, natural formations,
or ancient remedies.”20 The UNESCO Convention’s definition of
cultural heritage is categorical, and heritage is broadly divided
into cultural, natural, and heritage in the event of armed con-
flict.21 UNESCO further divides cultural heritage into tangible
18. This sentiment is the core concept on which UNESCO’s World Herit-
age Centre is founded. About World Heritage, UNESCO,
http://whc.unesco.org/en/about/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2015).
19. Lyndel V. Prott & Patrick J. O’Keefe, ‘Cultural Heritage’ or ‘Cultural
Property’?, 1 INT’L J. CULT. PROP. 307, 313 (1992).
20. Defining cultural heritage is difficult, as it can vary across cultures,
and a strict definition promotes artificial boundaries as to what is and what
is not “cultural” in the Western sense. For more information on the problems
with defining cultural heritage, see Sarah Harding, Value, Obligation and
Cultural Heritage, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 291, 297–304 (1999).
21. Although UNESCO specifies what cultural heritage encompasses, it
does not define the term. This allows each party to the UNESCO Convention
to choose what it considers as cultural heritage to be protected by the treaty.
See What is Meant by “Cultural Heritage”?, UNESCO,
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-
property/unesco-database-of-national-cultural-heritage-laws/frequently-
asked-questions/definition-of-the-cultural-heritage/ (last visited Sept. 21,
2015). Unfortunately, there is no explanation here as to what “heritage in the
event of an armed conflict” means, but it most likely refers to both cultural
and natural heritage removed or obtained during armed conflicts. The Con-
vention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
gives some insight into this phrase’s meaning. See Convention for the Protec-
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and intangible cultural heritage and tangible heritage into
movable, immovable, and underwater heritage.22 This categori-
cal approach to cultural heritage is significant because the
UNESCO Convention is the preeminent international legal in-
strument for the protection of cultural property. The text of the
UNESCO Convention however, uses the term “cultural proper-
ty” and “cultural heritage” interchangeably and only defines
“cultural property.”23 Therefore, the definition of cultural herit-
age used by UNESCO can be understood as much more inclu-
sive than that provided by the UNESCO Convention itself.24
The measures by which cultural heritage is protected vary
from nation to nation, but generally speaking they take the
form of laws and acts, all of which aim to protect, preserve, and
retain culturally valuable objects.25 On the international scale,
cultural heritage is protected by treaties, protocols, and con-
ventions designed to provide similar guidelines as the local
tion of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249
U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
22. What is Meant by “Cultural Heritage”?, supra note 21. UNESCO also
provides examples of each type of heritage. The cultural property versus cul-
tural heritage debate is a topic deserving a Note of its own and it is a conver-
sation that continues to be explored. For a general introduction to the prob-
lems presented by this distinction, see Prott & O’Keefe, supra note 19; Manlio
Frigo, Cultural Property v. Cultural Heritage: A “Battle of Concepts” in Inter-
national Law?, 86 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 367 (2004).
23. Article 1 of the UNESCO Convention defines cultural property as
“property which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by
each State as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, litera-
ture, art or science.” UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property, art. 1, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 10 I.L.M. 289 (1971) [here-
inafter 1970 UNESCO Convention]. The Convention then provides specific
categories of cultural property. Id.
24. The cultural heritage debate is beyond the scope of this Note, and
much has been written about this topic. See, e.g., John Henry Merryman,
Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 831(1986);
see generally HERITAGE AND THE CULTURE OF NATURAL HERITAGE; NORTHERN
PERSPECTIVES ON A CONTESTED PATRIMONY (Kenneth R. Olwig & David Low-
enthal eds., 2006); THE ETHICS OF CULTURALHERITAGE (Tracy Ireland & John
Schofield eds., 2015). It is likely that the debate will continue to inspire new
questions as new approaches to heritage develop in the future.
25. See generally ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE
(Barbara T. Hoffman ed., 2006).
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laws.26 International instruments, however, are loftier in that
they are often the source for the equivalent domestic legislation
as in the case of the UNESCO Convention.27
B. The Birth of an International Movement: The UNESCO
Convention28
In many ways, the UNESCO Convention can be interpreted
to be the natural extension of the earlier Hague Convention for
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con-
flict of 1954 (“Hague Convention”).29 The Hague Convention,
largely a product of the post-World War II era, recognized that
“damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatso-
ever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind,
since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the
world.”30 Furthermore, the Hague Convention emphasized that
“this [cultural] heritage should receive international protec-
tion.”31
26. For a general discussion of the relationship between international law
and cultural heritage, see CRAIG FORREST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
PROTECTION OF CULTURALHERITAGE (2010).
27. As in the case of most of the UNESCO instruments, the aim is also
“the promotion of understanding between nations and mutual appreciation.”
P.J. O’KEEFE & L.V. PROTT, LAW AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE 8–9 (1984).The
hope is that a better understanding of each country’s cultural differences will
result in better cooperation in the future. Id. Of course this also fosters na-
tional identity, which is often the main driving force between many cultural
clashes. Id.
28. For a general discussion of the UNESCO Convention, its effects, and
adoption, see PATRICK J. O’KEEFE, COMMENTARY ON THE UNESCO 1970
CONVENTION ON ILLICIT TRAFFIC (2000).
29. The Hague Convention was preceded by earlier Hague Conferences in
the early 1900s, which in turn were heavily influenced by the United States’
Lieber Code that was drafted during the American Civil War. James G. Gar-
ner, General Order 100 Revisited, 27 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1965). Article 35 of the
code limits the destruction of cultural heritage, while Article 36 discusses
ownership of heritage claimed during wartime stating “ultimate ownership is
to be settled by the ensuing treaty of peace.” See Gen. Order No. 100, In-
structions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field
(1863) reprinted in 2 F. LIEBER, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS 246 [hereinafter
The Lieber Code].
30. Hague Convention, supra note 21, pmbl. ¶2.
31. Id. ¶3.
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The goals of the Hague Convention were expanded and fur-
ther promoted by the UNESCO Convention.32 The drafting pro-
cess was long and arduous, as is the case with many interna-
tional instruments.33 The final text of the UNESCO Convention
was the product of over a decade of dedicated cooperation
among more than fifty nations. 34 In essence, the UNESCO
Convention defines cultural property and its categories35 and
places obligations on states that restrict the importation and
exportation of cultural property that falls under its protec-
tion.36 It is important to note that the UNESCO Convention,
unlike the Hague Convention, extended the protection of cul-
tural heritage to peacetime.37 UNESCO reports,
To date, the 1970 Convention has been ratified by 127 Mem-
ber States of UNESCO . . . . However, given the spectacular
globalization of illegal trade of cultural objects over the past
decades, it is now more than ever essential that all countries
join the ranks of State Parties to the Convention, to prevent
32. On its website, UNESCO provides a quick glimpse of why the
UNESCO Convention was adopted:
At the end of the1960s and in the beginning of the 1970s, thefts were
increasing both in museums and at archaeological sites, particularly
in the countries of the South. In the North, private collectors and,
sometimes, official institutions, were increasingly offered objects
that had been fraudulently imported or were of unidentified origin.
It is in this context, and to address such situations, the Convention
on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Ex-
port and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property was created in
1970.
1970 Convention, UNESCO,
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-
property/1970-convention/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2015).
33. For a brief overview of the context and process of preparation of the
UNESCO Convention, see O’KEEFE, supra note 28, at 8–14.
34. Kevin F. Jowers, Comment, International and National Legal Efforts
to Protect Cultural Property: The 1970 UNESCO Convention, the United
States, and Mexico, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 145, 148–149 (2003).
35. ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THEMARKET 5 (Valentina Vadi & Hilde-
gard E.G.S. Schneider eds. 2014).
36. Katherine D. Vitale, Note, The War on Antiquities: United States Law
and Foreign Cultural Property, 84 NOTREDAME L. REV 1835, 1840 (2009).
37. Jane Warring, Comment, Underground Debates: The Fundamental
Differences of Opinion that Thwart UNESCO’s Progress in Fighting the Illicit
Trade in Cultural Property, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 227, 247, 250 (2005).
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further impoverishment of their own heritage, which also be-
longs to all of humanity.38
1. The Text
The text of the UNESCO Convention commences with a pre-
amble that states the purpose of the document’s twenty-six ar-
ticles and outlines the scope of the Convention.39 Article 1 is
perhaps the most important provision as it provides UNESCO’s
definition of cultural property, and designates the types of cul-
tural heritage protected under its umbrella.40 Furthermore, it
allows States to designate their own items of cultural signifi-
cance to protect.41 Article 3 dictates that “the import, export or
transfer of ownership of cultural property effected contrary to
the provisions adopted under this Convention by the States
Parties thereto, shall be illicit,”42 and is to be read in conjunc-
tion with Article 6’s requirement that parties “introduce an ap-
propriate certificate in which the exporting State would specify
that the export of the cultural property in question is author-
ized.”43 The impact of reading Articles 3 and 6 together is sig-
nificant because it “suggest[s] that, a State Party to the Con-
vention is required to regard as unlawful, in its national law,
the import of goods exported from another State Party contrary
to that State’s export provisions.”44
Articles 7 and 9 are of special interest because they are the
only two Articles implemented by the United States through
the CPIA.45 Article 7 necessitates that States take the appro-
priate measures in implementing the UNESCO Convention in
38. See 1970 Convention State Parties, UNESCO,
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-
property/1970-convention/states-parties/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2015). The
newest member to ratify the UNESCO Convention is Chile as of April 18,
2014. For the full list of parties to the UNESCO Convention, see Legal In-
struments, UNESCO,
www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E (last visited
Sept. 21, 2015)
39. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 23, arts. 1–26.
40. Id. art. 1.
41. Id.
42. Id. art. 3.
43. Id. art. 6(a).
44. O’KEEFE, supra note 28, at 42. In other words, unless the exportation
of the cultural property was authorized by the source country, it should be
considered illegal.
45. Vitale, supra note 36, at 1844.
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a way consistent with national legislation.46 Article 9 then al-
lows any State Party whose cultural heritage may be in danger
of pillage or illicit removal to call upon other Parties for aid.47
Many of the remaining twenty-six articles have often been re-
ferred to as “mere rhetoric”48 and do not impose any real re-
quirements on the State Party signatories.49
2. Challenges in Drafting the UNESCO Convention and the
Resulting Limitations
The main challenge faced by the drafters of the UNESCO
Convention was “reaching a compromise that would be ac-
ceptable to a broad international community, due to the diverg-
ing views and priorities among states.”50 This refers to the dif-
fering goals related to cultural property, as understood by
market nations and source nations.51 Market nations are most-
ly developed countries with established antiquities markets,
46. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 23, art. 7. The United
States was responsible for the insertion of the phrase “consistent with na-
tional legislation,” which gave the effect of constricting “the effect of this
measure to museums whose acquisition policies are controlled by the State.”
See O’KEEFE, supra note 28, at 58.
47. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 23, art. 9. Article 9 is lim-
ited in that it only refers to archaeological and ethnographical materials in
danger and does not protect other types of cultural patrimony, such as art,
which may be in danger.
48. See PAULM. BATOR, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ART 42–43 (1983).
49. Most notably, authors cite Article 2 as the best example of this “rhetor-
ical rather than substantive” type of provision. Paul M. Bator, An Essay on
the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV 275, 377 (1982). Article 2 is a
general statement on the negative impact of illicit trade in cultural heritage
on states and provides that states will battle this evil “with the means at
their disposal.” See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 23, art. 2. The
problem with such a provision is that the source nations being plundered
usually do not have the means to battle the illicit antiquities trade while the
market nations do, but these market nations have taken many years to be-
come parties to the UNESCO Convention or have never signed it at all. Nina
R. Lezner, Comment, The Illicit International Trade in Cultural Property:
Does the UNIDROIT Convention Provide an Effective Remedy for the Short-
comings of the UNESCO Convention?, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 469, 480
(1994).
50. Ronald D. Abramson & Stephen B. Huttler, Note, The Legal Response
to the Illicit Movement of Cultural Property, 5 J.L. & POL’Y INT’LBUS. 932, 935
(1973).
51. Lisa J. Borodkin, Note, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a
Proposed Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 385 (1995).
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like the United States. Source nations (countries of origin) are
countries from which antiquities are removed, and are usually
developing countries such as Cambodia or countries ravaged by
war and other large scale catastrophes.52 This dichotomy has
further surfaced as two separate doctrines within the cultural
property debate.53
Another challenge is the fact that, like many other UNESCO
instruments, the UNESCO Convention is more of a model than
a set rule of law; it proposes an international mission and
leaves its signatories “to implement its tenets through their
own national legislation.”54 It is challenging to reinforce a doc-
ument that seemingly has no legal effect and is impossible to
enforce, especially when it is inconsistent with a signatory par-
ty’s national legislation.55 Therefore, if a country cannot see the
potential repercussions of its actions, it will continue to act in
ways it finds most beneficial to itself and its constituents. Not
surprisingly the United States, one of the largest market na-
tions in the world, was a key party to the drafting of the
UNESCO Convention and sought to include provisions favora-
ble to its own views on cultural heritage protection.56 However,
52. Id.
53. This is the debate between cultural nationalism (advocated by source
nations in terms of source-country rights) and cultural internationalism (ad-
vocated by museums and private collectors and dealers in terms of the free
market and international exchange of artifact rights). Merryman, supra note
24, at 846.
54. Matthew R. Hoffman, Cultural Pragmatism: A New Approach to the
International Movement of Antiquities, 95 IOWA L. REV. 665, 677 (2010). Paul
Bator, who was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Special Committee for
the UNESCO Convention, has stated that “only a small fraction of the Con-
vention was intended to have serious operative consequences.” Id. at 370.
Furthermore, Bator refers to the provisions of the UNESCO Convention as
“ceremonial, rhetorical and ineffective.” Id. at 376.
55. How a state undertakes to fulfill its obligations under the UNESCO
Convention “depends on its political, legal and administrative structure.”
O’KEEFE, supra note 28, at 102. This translates to the passage of legislative
acts implementing the obligations of the UNESCO Conventions in some
countries, while mere administrative acts may suffice in others. Id.
56. Jowers, supra note 34, at 149. The United States produced its own
draft of the text of the UNESCO Convention, and the final draft was strongly
influenced by this American version. O’KEEFE, supra note 28, at 13. On the
other side of the spectrum were nations like Mexico, which were interested
mainly in a document that offered more protectionist measures to source na-
tions. Initially, however, the United States was not interested in helping
draft the UNESCO Convention, but the changing political scene developing
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the drafters of the UNESCO Convention understood that the
instrument itself would not be enough to provide the necessary
level of protection against the illegal antiquities market and
expected that the proper level of protection would be “advanced
through additional measures by states.”57
The UNESCO Convention is further limited by the fact that
it fails to provide any binding mechanisms for dispute resolu-
tion except for “extend[ing] its good offices to reach a settle-
ment between States Parties engaged in a dispute on imple-
mentation of the Convention.”58 It is more than problematic
that “[t]here is no other mechanism indicated to resolve dis-
putes arising from the Convention.” 59 Nonetheless, the
UNESCO Convention has made some impact in lieu of a lack of
a uniform approach to eliminating illegal antiquities market.
Most importantly, it has paved the ways for other treaties such
as the 1995 International Institute for the Unification of Pri-
vate Law Convention (“UNIDROIT Convention”) and the other
numerous conventions dealing with specific types of cultural
heritage.60
More frequently, however, the UNESCO Convention has
been highly criticized for its shortcomings and is often labeled a
failure.61 One reason that the UNESCO Convention has been
underutilized is that international litigation is very costly and
in the 1960s “motivated [the U.S.] government to seek better relations with a
number of developing States, particularly those in its own hemisphere.”
O’KEEFE, supra note 28, at 13.
57. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 23, arts. 5, 6, 10, 13 & 14.
58. Id. art. 17(5). Interestingly, the provision states that UNESCO will
only do so “at the request of at least two States Parties to this Convention
which are engaged in a dispute over its implementation.” Id.
59. O’KEEFE, supra note 28, at 96.
60. There are now conventions designed to protect intangible cultural her-
itage, underwater cultural heritage, world heritage, and natural heritage. See
Conventions, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG.,
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=12025&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=-471.html (last
visited Sept. 24, 2014)
61. Critics point to the lack of retroactivity as an example. In addition, “too
few of the states parties to the Convention adopted implementing national
legislation, and most of these were source countries, not market countries.”
Vitale, supra note 36, at 1842. This is significant because market countries
were the main players during the drafting of the UNESCO Convention and
many of the goals and definitions reflected in the text stem from those coun-
tries interests.
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time consuming.62 Other reasons may be that state parties are
slow to implement national legislation to make the UNESCO
Convention applicable, while others have simply not joined or
were very slow to do so.63 Furthermore, complications arise
from the actual text of the UNESCO Convention that are the
result of the lack of compromise by nations during the actual
drafting process.64 This has led to “variable interpretations and
differential implementation of the Convention in the State Par-
ties.”65 In addition, since the UNESCO Convention is non-self-
executing, parties to the agreement have wide latitude in how
they choose to implement it and which articles they wish to
adopt.66
C. Cultural Heritage Legislation in the United States
Cultural heritage legislation existed in the United States ex-
isted before the adoption of the UNESCO Convention in the
form of criminal statues such as the NSPA. However with the
implementation of the UNESCO Convention, it became appar-
ent that the existing body of U.S. legislation was at odds with
itself. In fact, the UNESCO Convention, the very pinnacle of
international heritage protection, had neither the expected im-
pact nor the efficacy of what it promised to deliver.
62. O’KEEFE supra note 28, at 120.
63. For example, it took over a decade for the United States to pass legisla-
tion implementing the UNESCO Convention while Belgium ratified the
UNESCO Convention only in 2009. See 1970 Convention State Parties,
UNESCO,
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?ko=13039&language=e (last vis-
ited Sept. 24, 2015)
64. Lyndel V. Prott, Strengths and Weaknesses of the 1970 Convention:
An Evaluation 40 Years After its Adoption, at 4, U.N. Doc.
CLT/2011/CONF.207/7 (Mar. 15, 2011), available at
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/FIELD/Brussels/pdf/str
engths%20and%20weaknesses%20of%20the1970%20convention.pdf.
65. Id.
66. Article 7(a) requires parties “to take the necessary measures, con-
sistent with national legislation, to prevent museums and similar institutions
within their territories from acquiring cultural property originating in anoth-
er State Party which has been illegally exported after entry into force of this
Convention, in the States concerned.” See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra
note 23.
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1. CPIA
The United States implemented the UNESCO Convention
with the passing of the CPIA in 1983.67 The CPIA addresses
import controls,68 authorizes the President to enter into agree-
ments with nations requesting U.S. cooperation in the applica-
tion of import restrictions on cultural heritage,69 and regulates
transfer, recovery, and return of cultural property.70 The CPIA
also created the Cultural Property Advisory Committee (CPAC)
responsible for determining whether requesting source coun-
tries’ heritage is in jeopardy and deciding whether or not to re-
strict the import of objects from that country.71
67. 19 U.S.C. §§2601–13 (2010). The CPIA can be understood as a way to
improve relations with source countries since the United States is a major
market country with an active illegal antiquities trade, a fact Congress rec-
ognized. Vitale, supra note 36, at 1843. Furthermore, the CPIA aimed to
modify and possibly overturn the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v.
McClain, where the court applied the NSPA and recognized that foreign laws
of the country of origin that vest ownership of cultural heritage create owner-
ship recognized by the United States. 545 F. 2d 988, 992 (5th Cir. 1977).
Hence, cultural property illegally entering into the United Stated is consid-
ered stolen. Vitale, supra note 36, at 1842. It is important to point out that
the United States only adopted Articles 7(b)(1) and 9 of the UNESCO Con-
vention. Vitale, supra note 36, at 1844. Article 7(b)(1) is the prohibition of
import of cultural property that is stolen, while Article 9 allows any source
country whose heritage is under pillage to request the help of other State
Parties in its prevention. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 23. For
information on the United States’ approach to drafting and ratifying the
UNESCO Convention, as well its reasons for adopting the Convention in lim-
ited form, see Bator, supra note 49.
68. Specifically, these import controls impose restrictions relating to ob-
jects that are being looted and pillaged from archaeological sites as well as
ethnographic materials. Jowers, supra note 34, at 155. The President makes
his determination as to whether or not impose import restrictions based on
whether (a) the cultural heritage of the source country in question is being
looted despite that country’s attempt to protect such heritage; (b) the re-
striction on importation would be the correct and effective way of curbing the
problem; and (c) whether the action would be in the general interest of the
international community. John Alan Cohan, An Examination of Archaeologi-
cal Ethics and the Repatriation Movement Respecting Cultural Property (Part
II), 28 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 47 (2004).
69. § 2602 (discussing the President’s enforcement of Article 9 of the
UNESCO Convention).
70. See §§ 2601, 2606–07.
71. § 2605 (describing the makeup, tenure, and purpose of the Committee).
Because the Committee makes its determinations based on the merit of each
request, Vitale, supra note 36, at 1846, there is no guarantee that these re-
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In addition, the CPIA allows the United States to enter into
bi- and multilateral agreements under the authority of the
President to restrict the importation of cultural materials as
understood in Article 9 of the UNESCO Convention.72 Known
as Memoranda of Understanding (“MOU”), these agreements
are useful as they allow the United States to negotiate favora-
ble terms with other State Parties to the UNESCO Convention
without the need for Senate ratification of a new treaty, a pro-
cess that can be very time consuming.73
To enter into an MOU, a country has to bring a request to the
United States that is then referred to CPAC. 74 The request
must satisfy four statutorily required criteria75 in order to be
quests will be successful. Hence, the CPIA has a built in mechanism limiting
import controls.
72. § 2602(a)(2)(A)–(B). These agreements are referred to as Memoranda of
Understanding or MOUs. For a list of restrictions on these agreements, see
§ 2602(a)(2)(c)(1), and for a list of exceptions to such restrictions, see
§ 2602(a)(2)(c)(2). The President can also act under § 2603 in an emergency
measure, but here again, the source nation must make a request. One of the
main problems with these MOUs is that they “fail to satisfy the basic legal
requirements of the CPIA” and “[t]hey cannot be reconciled with the plain
language of the CPIA.” William G. Pearlstein, White Paper: A Proposal to
Reform U.S. Law and Policy Relating to the International Exchange of Cul-
tural Property, 32 CARDOZO ARTS&ENT. L.J. 561, 575 (2014).
73. Archaeological Inst. of Am., United States Implementation of the 1970
UNESCO Convention: The Convention on Cultural Property Implementation
Act,
https://www.archaeological.org/pdfs/sitepreservation/CPAC_OverviewAIA.pdf
(last visited Nov. 19, 2015) [hereinafter AIA Overview].
74. Id.
75. The four criteria are:
(A) that the cultural patrimony of the State Party is in jeopardy from
the pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials of the State
Party;
(B) that the State Party has taken measures consistent with the
Convention to protect its cultural patrimony;
(C) that--
(i) the application of the import restrictions set forth in section 2606
of this title with respect to archaeological or ethnological material of
the State Party, if applied in concert with similar restrictions im-
plemented, or to be implemented within a reasonable period of time,
by those nations (whether or not State Parties) individually having a
significant import trade in such material, would be of substantial
benefit in deterring a serious situation of pillage, and
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further considered, and once this determination is made,
“CPAC makes recommendations to the delegated decision mak-
er as to whether to enter into or extend an agreement.” The
delegated decision maker will usually be a State Department
official who is part of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs.76 Once signed, a MOU remains effective for five years
and may be renewed a limitless number of times.77
The CPIA also allows for import restrictions in cases of emer-
gency, without the need to negotiate a bilateral agreement.78
However, such emergency action can only be implemented if
the State Party requesting it has made a request for an MOU.79
Should an emergency measure be allowed, it may stay in place
for up to five years and can be extended for an additional three
years, but only once.80
These agreements, however, are designed to be made only be-
tween State Parties to the UNESCO Convention, and, to date,
(ii) remedies less drastic than the application of the restrictions set
forth in such section are not available; and
(D) that the application of the import restrictions set forth in section
2606 of this title in the particular circumstances is consistent with
the general interest of the international community in the inter-
change of cultural property among nations for scientific, cultural,
and educational purposes;
19 U.S.C. § 2602 (a)(1). In addition to these requirements there are also ap-
plicable exceptions to criterion (3):
Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President may enter into an
agreement if he determines that a nation individually having a sig-
nificant import trade in such material is not implementing, or is not
likely to implement, similar restrictions, but--
(A) such restrictions are not essential to deter a serious situation of
pillage, and
(B) the application of the import restrictions set forth in section 2606
of this title in concert with similar restrictions implemented, or to be
implemented, by other nations (whether or not State Parties) indi-
vidually having a significant import trade in such material would be
of substantial benefit in deterring a serious situation of pillage.
Id. § 2602 (c)(2).
76. AIA Overview, supra note 73.
77. 19 U.S.C. § 2602 (c)(2).
78. Id. § 2603.
79. Id. § 2603 (c)(1).
80. Id. § 2603 (c)(3).
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the United States has signed seventeen treaties.81 Hence, the
CPIA effectively prohibits nonsignatories to the UNESCO Con-
vention from gaining any aid benefits from the United States.
The CPIA is limited by the United States’ adoption of only
two Articles of the UNESCO Convention. During the ratifica-
tion process, the United States reserved the right to “determine
whether or not to impose export controls over cultural proper-
ty”82 and further limited its acceptance of the treaty through
six “understandings.”83 This meant that the United States un-
81. Agreements have been signed with Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Can-
ada, China Colombia, Cyprus, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras,
Iraq, Italy, Mali, Nicaragua, and Peru. The United States and Peru are also
parties to the 1981 Agreement Respecting the Recovery and Return of Stolen
Archaeological, Historical, and Cultural Properties. Lawrence J. Persick, The
Continuing Development of United States Policy Concerning the International
Movement of Cultural Property, 4 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 89, 101 (1985). Each
agreement specifies items designated for protection. See Bilateral Agree-
ments, BUREAU OF EDUC. & CULT. AFFAIRS, http://eca.state.gov/cultural-
heritage-center/cultural-property-protection/bilateral-agreements (last visited
Sept. 24, 2015). Noticeably, the majority of the agreements are with develop-
ing source countries. In addition to these agreements, the United States has
earlier agreements with nations like Mexico. James E. Sherry, Note, U.S.
Legal Mechanisms for the Repatriation of Cultural Property: Evaluating
Strategies for the Successful Recovery of Claimed National Patrimony, 37
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 511, 522 (2005). The Treaty of Cooperation, which
was signed in 1970, is “unique in that it specifically authorizes the U.S. at-
torney general to commence a judicial action for the recovery of property
claimed by the Government of Mexico to constitute part of its national patri-
mony.” Sherry, supra note 81, at 522.
82. 118 CONG. REC. 27,925 (1972).
83. The six understandings were:
(1) The United States understands the provisions of the Convention
to be neither self-executing nor retroactive.
(2) The United States understands Article 3 not to modify property
interests in cultural property under the laws of the States parties.
(3) The United States understands Article 7 (a) to apply to institu-
tions whose acquisition policy is subject to national control under ex-
isting domestic legislation and not to require the enactment of new
legislation to establish national control over other institutions.
(4) The United States understands that Article 7(b) is without preju-
dice to other remedies, civil or penal, available under the laws of the
States parties for the recovery of stolen cultural property to the
rightful owner without payment of compensation. The United States
is further prepared to take the additional steps contemplated by Ar-
ticle 7(b)(ii) for the return of covered stolen cultural property without
payment of compensation, except to the extent required by the Con-
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derstood its obligations to extend only to museums and similar
institutions and not to private individuals. Not surprisingly,
U.S. courts have rarely invoked the CPIA.84
2. The NSPA
In addition to the CPIA, the United States passed earlier
criminal statutes relating to cultural property and its theft.
The NSPA passed in 1934, an extension of the National Motor
Vehicle Theft Act of 1919, criminalized the interstate or inter-
national transportation of any stolen property as well as the
stitution of the United States, for those States parties that agree to
do the same for the United States institutions.
(5) The United States understands the words “as appropriate for
each country” in Article 10(a) as permitting each State party to de-
termine the extent of regulation, if any, of antique dealers and de-
clares that in the United States that determination would be made
by the appropriate authorities of state and municipal governments.
(6) The United States understands Article 13(d) as applying to ob-
jects removed from the country of origin after the entry into force of
this Convention for the States concerned, and, as stated by the
Chairman of the Special Committee of Governmental Experts that
prepared the text, and reported in paragraph 28 of the Report of that
Committee, the means of recovery of cultural property under sub-
paragraph (d) are the judicial actions referred to in subparagraph (c)
of Article 13, and that such actions are controlled by the law of the
requested State, the requesting State having to submit necessary
proofs.
Id. [hereinafter the Six Understandings]. These points were key issues in the
United States’ ratification of the treaty and reflect the earlier concerns of the
U.S. delegation of too much emphasis on protection of patrimony at the ex-
pense of competing interests, specifically the “free-trade agenda.” See ANA
FILIPA VRDOLJAK, INTERNATIONAL LAW, MUSEUMS AND THE RETURN OF
CULTURALOBJECTS 242 (2006). However, it was well understood that the par-
ticipation of the United States in such international endeavors was absolute-
ly necessary “if the Convention was ever to be effective.” O’KEEFE, supra note
28, at 14.
84. As of 2005, “no published judicial opinion has been decided pursuant to
section 2606 [import restrictions section] since the CPIA’s enactment.” See
Sherry, supra note 81, at 521. More recently, some authors have suggested
that policy changes since the initial adoption of the CPIA have resulted in
judicial favor of criminal and forfeiture laws for the prosecution of cultural
heritage cases. Pearlstein, supra note 72, at 564. For example, in United
States v. Schultz, the Second Circuit stated, “The CPIA is an import law, not
a criminal law; it is not codified in Title 18 [on] Crimes and Criminal Proce-
dure[], with the NSPA, but in Title 19 [on] Customs Duties[].” 333 F.3d 393,
409 (2003).
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possession, transfer, and receipt of stolen property that an in-
dividual knows to be stolen.85 The original 1919 Act was passed
as a response to problems arising of out of the growing automo-
bile culture that provided new ways of escape for criminals
moving goods through interstate commerce.86 However, the im-
proved NSPA lacked a definition of “goods” and was left to be
interpreted by courts. 87 However, “no court has interpreted
‘goods’ in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2315 [but] courts
have considered the appropriate definition in litigation under
the other operative section of the NSPA.”88 Later in 1986, Con-
gress amended two provisions of section 2315 of the NSPA.
First, Congress expanded the scope of the offense requirement
with the addition of “possession” to receipt and concealment
and second, by changing the language in the requirement that
goods be moving or be part of interstate or foreign commerce.89
The new language included goods “which have crossed a State
or United States boundary after being stolen.”90
The NSPA was first successfully applied in United States v.
Hollinshead, a 1974 case involving a Mayan stele removed
from its original location by looters, cut into pieces, and later
smuggled from Guatemala to the United States.91 Clive Hollin-
shead, a dealer of pre-Columbian art who, along with a con-
spirator, arranged to procure and bring to the United States a
number of artifacts from Central America.92 The stele, which is
a slab or pillar of stone usually carved or inscribed,93 was val-
85. The NSPA lists the value of the stolen good at $5000 or more and pro-
vides that anyone found guilty under this statute “shall be fined or impris-
oned not more than ten years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2014)
86. Stephen K. Urice, Between Rocks and Hard Places: Unprovenanced
Antiquities and the National Stolen Property Act, 40 N.M. L. REV. 123, 133
(2010).
87. While the NSPA provides a number of definitions, “goods” is not de-
fined. § 2311. This may have been intentional to protect a greater number of
stolen items under the NSPA.
88. Urice, supra note 86, at 133.
89. Id. at 134.
90. Id. This was significant because the defense that the goods had left
interstate commerce by “coming to rest” or by the passage of time was now
eliminated. Id.
91. U.S. v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1974).
92. Id.
93. Stela, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/stela (last visited Dec. 29, 2014). Both “stele” and
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ued at thousands of dollars and was unsuccessfully shopped
around to a number of museums and collectors once it reached
the United States.94
Guatemala made a strong case under the NSPA for the re-
turn of the stele. Their claim was strengthened by the fact that
Guatemala’s ownership of the object was uncontested.95 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding by finding
that under Guatemala’s patrimony law “all such artifacts are
the property of the Republic, and may not be removed without
permission of the government.”96
The Hollinshead holding was further developed in 1977 in
United States v. McClain, where the defendants were convicted
of “conspiring to transport, receive, and sell assorted pre-
Columbian artifacts” of Mexican origin as well as “receiving,
concealing, bartering, and selling these items” in violation of
the NSPA.97 Although the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district
court on the applicability of the NSPA to instances of illegal
exportation of cultural property deemed by a source country’s
laws to be the national property of that country,98 it held that
“only in 1972 . . . did the [Mexican] government declare that all
pre-Columbian artifacts were owned by the Republic.”99 This
“stela” are considered correct spellings, as it a transliteration from the an-
cient Greek word στήλη.
94. See Hollinshead, 495 F.2d at 1155. The stele ultimately remained in
Hollinshead’s possession. Id.
95. Jowers, supra note 34, at 168.
96. See Hollinshead, 495 F.2d at 1155. The Court further added that evi-
dence showed that the defendants knew that removal of artifacts was prohib-
ited under Guatemalan law. Id.
97. See U.S. v. McClain, 545 F. 2d 988, 992 (5th Cir. 1977). The defendants
were specifically found guilty of violating §§ 2314–15 of the NSPA. Id. at 991.
The items in question were terra cotta figurines, pottery, beads, and pieces of
stucco. Id. at 992. The defendants contended that “there was no evidence
showing that the artifacts had been taken without consent from private indi-
viduals or that the artifacts had been in the possession of the Republic of
Mexico.” Id. at 992, 994.
98. Id. at 996.
99. Id. at 1000. This was a key issue in this case as Mexico had cultural
heritage laws as early as 1897, and the 1972 statute referred to by the Court
was simply the most recent modification of that law. Id. at 993. The Fifth
Circuit remanded the case to the trial court and the case was appealed. Id. at
1004. Again, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the applicability of the NSPA but
reversed the conviction on the substantive count, stating that a jury likely
believed “that Mexico declared itself owner of all artifacts as early as 1897”
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fact may have been the decisive factor for the defendants dur-
ing the jury trial, and was also a major factor in leading the
Fifth Circuit to reverse the convictions.100
In certain aspects, the NSPA can be said to provide more
prudent protections than the CPIA because it is a criminal
statute and allows for criminal prosecutions.101 Critics of the
CPIA point to the fact that its passing did not add much sub-
stance to the already existing body of cultural heritage protec-
tion law in the United States, since the NSPA had already been
in existence and provides a wider scope of protection.102 On the
other hand, proving the scienter requirement of the NSPA (i.e.
showing that the defendant knew that the item was stolen) is
often very difficult, especially when the stolen object is undoc-
umented.103 The CPIA with its MOU requirement and the re-
view process under CPAC’s authority can be circumvented by
litigation under the NSPA, so long as the source country has a
“valid patrimony law and a restriction on exportations of the
kind of property contemplated by the patrimony law.”104 To-
gether, the CPIA and the NSPA, along with a few other stat-
utes pertaining to cultural heritage protection, aim to provide a
comprehensive doctrine of the American stance on protection of
cultural patrimony.105
but “has not expressed that view with sufficient clarity to survive translation
into terms understandable by and binding upon American citizens.” U.S. v.
McClain 593 F.2d 658, 670 (5th Cir. 1979). Hence, the law was “too vague to
be a predicate for criminal liability under our jurisprudential standards.” Id.
100. McClain, 545 F.2d at 1000–03.
101. Kavita Sharma, From the Mayan Machaquila Stele to Egyptian Phar-
aoh Amenhotep’s Head: United States Courts’ Enforcement of Foreign Nation-
al Patrimony Laws After United States v. Schultz, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 749, 756
(2005).
102. In addition what was already provided for by the NSPA, “the civil pro-
visions in the CPIA added little to the existing law except to enable action by
customs officials.” See VRDOLJAK, supra note 83, at 243.
103. Leila Amineddoleh, Protecting Cultural Heritage by Strictly Scrutiniz-
ing Museum Acquisitions, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 729,
757–758 (2014). It is important to note that there is no mens rea requirement
under the CPIA to prove a good was “stolen” because it is not a criminal stat-
ute.
104. Vitale, supra note 36, at 1851.
105. In cases where defendants claimed that the CPIA should be under-
stood as “the only mechanism by which the United States government would
deal with antiquities and other ‘cultural property’ imported into the United
States,” courts found that “nothing in the language of the CPIA supports that
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D. Cultural Heritage Legislation in Australia: The PMCHA106
Australia officially implemented the UNESCO Convention
with the passing of the PMCHA in 1986.107 A counterpart to the
CPIA, the PMCHA protects national and international cultural
property and imposes import and export controls consistent
with the intent of the UNESCO Convention.108 Like the CPIA,
the PMCHA also creates a committee, the National Cultural
Heritage Committee,109 which is responsible for advising the
Minister of the Arts on matters of operation of the PMCHA, the
National Cultural Heritage Control List, and the National Cul-
tural Heritage Account.110
interpretation, and the legislative history shows that exactly the converse is
true.” See U.S. v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 408 (2003). Furthermore, the Second
Circuit added that “the ‘CPIA affects neither existing remedies available in
state or federal courts nor laws prohibiting the theft and the knowing receipt
and transportation of stolen property in interstate and foreign commerce (e.g.
National Stolen Property Act).’” Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 97-564, at 33 (1982)).
The court concluded “that the passage of the CPIA does not limit the NSPA’s
application to antiquities stolen in foreign nations,” and the Hollinshead-
McClain doctrine remained in place. Id. at 409. The Second Circuit’s reason-
ing was followed as recently as 2012, when a New York district court rejected
a defendant’s argument that “Congress decided not to regulate the import of
undocumented paleontological objects when it passed the CPIA.” U.S. v. One
Tyrannosaurus Bataar Skeleton, 12 Civ. 4760 (PKC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
165153, at *5 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2012).
106. For a thorough exposition of Australia’s approach to cultural heritage
protection, see Craig Forrest, Australia’s Protection of Foreign States’ Cultur-
al Heritage, 27 U.N.S.W. L.J. 605 (2004).
107. VRDOLJAK, supra note 83, at 244. The PMCHA was in some ways an
extension of the laws already in existence, specifically the Customs Act of
1901, Customs Act 1901 (Cth) (Austl.). The Customs Acts however, protected
“fixed cultural property” and “was reactive, in the sense that it was applied
on a piecemeal basis to address crises as they arose.” VRDOLJAK, supra note
83, at 244.
108. Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 (Cth) pt. II (Austl.)
[hereinafter PMCHA]. Part 2 of the PMCHA specifically describes the import
and export controls and provides that the PMCHA operates based on the Na-
tional Cultural Heritage Control List, which divides cultural movable herit-
age into Class A–objects that cannot be exported from Australia unless they
have been imported temporarily and have a certificate of exemption for re-
export–and Class B–all other objects that can only be exported with a permit
or certificate. O’KEEFE, supra note 28, at 103.
109. See PMCHA supra note 108, pt. III.
110. For current information about the makeup of the Committee and other
information in connection to its activities, see National Cultural Heritage
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Unlike the restrictions placed on the ratification of the
UNESCO Convention by the United States, Australia only had
one with respect to Article 10.111 This meant that Australia was
not as limited in scope in its application of the UNESCO Con-
vention under its national laws. 112Furthermore, unlike the
CPIA, the PMCHA is not restricted to State Parties to the
UNESCO Convention and
applies to objects imported into Australia after 1 July 1987113
but which were previously exported from another country at
Committee, AUSTL. GOV’T: DEP’T OF COMM. AND THE ARTS,
http://arts.gov.au/movable/committee (last visited Sept. 24, 2015)
111. Article 10 states:
The States Parties to this Convention undertake: (a) To restrict by
education, information and vigilance, movement of cultural property
illegally removed from any State Party to this Convention and, as
appropriate for each country, oblige antique dealers, subject to penal
or administrative sanctions, to maintain a register recording the
origin of each item of cultural property, names and addresses of the
supplier, description and price of each item sold and to inform the
purchaser of the cultural property of the export prohibition to which
such property may be subject; [and] (b) to endeavour by educational
means to create and develop in the public mind a realization of the
value of cultural property and the threat to the cultural heritage
created by theft, clandestine excavations and illicit exports.
1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 23, art. 10. Australia’s reservation
states:
The Government of Australia declares that Australia is not at pre-
sent in a position to oblige antique dealers, subject to penal or ad-
ministrative sanctions, to maintain a register recording the origin of
each item of cultural property, names and addresses of the supplier,
description and price of each item sold and to inform the purchaser
of the cultural property of the export prohibition to which such prop-
erty may be subject. Australia therefore accepts the Convention sub-
ject to a reservation as to Article 10, to the extent that it is unable to
comply with the obligations imposed by that Article.
1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 23, Declarations and Reservations.
112. However, in reality, most of the PMCHA is predominantly concerned
with protecting Australia’s cultural heritage. Hugh H. Jamieson, The Protec-
tion of Australia’s Movable Cultural Heritage, 2 INT’L J. CULT. PROP. 215, 218
(1995). This may mean that countries who submit requests to Australia have
no real legal recourse.
113. PMCHA became Australian law on this date. See Commonwealth, Ga-
zette 1987, No.S138.
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any time where there was a cultural heritage protection law
in force, contrary to the provision of that law.114
Also the PMCHA does not require reciprocity, making Austral-
ia one of the few countries that do not possess such a require-
ment.115 Finally, “[t]o give effect to the UNESCO Convention . .
. the PMCHA provides for the seizure and forfeiture of illicitly
imported cultural heritage, and the imposition of penalties for
infringement.”116
The PMCHA differentiates between “repatriation” and “resti-
tution,” the former seeking to return sacred objects and human
remains, and the latter seeking to return other objects whether
secular or sacred.117 Repatriation is divided further into catego-
ries based on the subject of the repatriation claim. In the
broadest sense, claims can be seen as arising out of claims
where property was “legally obtained or collected but where the
circumstances of collection breach traditional beliefs or ethical
principles,”118 “legally obtained but disposed of illegally,”119 and
“illegally obtained but is legally held.”120 These can then be
even further divided when useful. Claims that are
“legally obtained but disposed of illegally” are the only types of
claims that fall under the PMCHA.121
Yet the PMCHA is not without its problems, even if it seems
more closely aligned with the UNESCO Convention’s ideals
than some other market nations’ cultural property regulations,
“particularly when compared to the reluctance . . . [of] the
United States.”122 While it addresses “the movement of objects
across national boundaries . . . [i]t does not address the remov-
114. VRDOLJAK, supra note 83, at 244–45 (quoting JOHN F. LEY, AUSTRALIA’S
PROTECTION OFMOVABLE CULTURALHERITAGE 125 (1991).
115. Canada, on the other hand, is an example of a country that does re-
quire reciprocity. Forrest, supra note 106, at 620–21.
116. Id. at 621.
117. Shane Simpson, Repatriation of Cultural Material, COLLECTIONS L.
(Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.collectionslaw.com.au/1repatriation.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. Claims that fall into the third category would be particularly well
served by the protections offered by the UNESCO Convention. However,
these types of claims must not fall under the protection of the PMCHA.
122. S.R.M. MACKENZIE, GOING, GOING, GONE: REGULATING THE MARKET IN
ILLICITANTIQUITIES 102 (2005).
356 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:1
al or destruction of cultural objects within Australia.”123 There
are also problems with the enforcement of the PMCHA,124 a
general lack of public awareness125 of the law, and the extent of
the illegal antiquities market in Australia. 126 And like the
CPIA, the PMCHA has not been frequently applied in the pros-
ecution of cases concerning the return of illegally traded art nor
has it frequently been applied to refusing export permits.127
A major problem in Australia is the general lack of a “sys-
tematic or single source of information . . . regarding the di-
mensions of the Australian market for antiquities.”128 Essen-
tially, Australian enforcement bodies simply cannot successful-
ly battle the problem of the illegal antiquities trade because
they do not even know how expansive it may be. This in turn,
means that any legislation designed to protect cultural heritage
and antiquities will be prima facie ineffective if it cannot target
the object it is designed to protect. Furthermore, because the
PMCHA focuses mainly on criminal offences and criminal en-
forcement mechanisms, a higher standard of proof is required,
meaning that “making and securing convictions [is] very diffi-
cult.”129 Some scholars argue that the PMCHA will not be able
to offer “any meaningful protection and priority . . . to protected
123. VRDOLJAK, supra note 83, at 245. A separate Act, the Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth), protects Austral-
ia’s indigenous cultural heritage. Id. at 247.
124. The PMCHA gives the Australian police and customs officials the pow-
er to search, seize, and arrest. MACKENZIE, supra note 122, at 74. However,
police and customs officials are often not adequately trained to recognize
pieces that may be culturally significant. Id.
125. See Jamieson, supra note 112, at 226. Not only is the public ignorant of
the provisions of the PMCHA, but officials are as well. Id. at 227. Even those
“involved in the operation” of the PMCHA are “confused about it.” Id.
126. Duncan Chappell & Damien Huffer, Protecting Cultural Heritage: A
Review of Some Contemporary Developments in Australia and Near Environs,
in CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE DETECTION, INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OF ART CRIME 237–38, 239 (Duncan Chappell & Saskia
Hufnagel eds., 2014).
127. For example, up until 1994 there were only eight objects whose export
was prohibited by the PMCHA. Jamieson, supra note 112, at 222. Four more
were added to that list by 1995. Id. Between 2000 and 2012, there were nine-
teen seizures of some forty-three objects under the PMCHA, thirty-four of
which were successfully returned to their countries of origin. Chappell &
Huffer, supra note 126, at 245.
128. Chappell & Huffer, supra note 126, at 239.
129. Simpson, supra note 117.
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cultural heritage objects illegally exported from other coun-
tries” unless is it amended to overcome some of its existing de-
ficiencies.130 Only then can Australia hope to effectively protect
not only its own cultural heritage but also the global heritage
the UNESCO Convention aimed to preserve.
II. THE PROBLEMWITH THERETROACTIVEAPPLICATION OF THE
UNESCOCONVENTION
The concept of the retroactive application of a convention is
one that is not often applied to international instruments. In
fact, conventions are prima facie not retroactive unless other-
wise specified. Yet retroactivity was important to the United
States during the drafting process of the UNESCO Conven-
tion.131 This Part illustrates the importance of retroactivity and
explores how the United States and Australia approached this
issue when passing their implementing legislation in order to
understand how a retroactive UNESCO Convention would al-
ter the current situation.
A. Why Should Retroactivity Matter?
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “retroactive” as “ex-
tending in scope or effect to matters that have occurred in the
past.”132 Retroactivity as a legal concept is “often used . . . but
rarely defined . . . moreover . . . it is used to cover at least two
distinct concepts.”133 As applied to international treaties, retro-
activity is a rarity and most international conventions are not
retroactive.134 A number of member State parties to the draft-
130. Chappell & Huffer, supra note 126, at 254.
131. See the Six Understandings, supra note 83.
132. Retroactive, BLACK’S LAWDICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
133. Retroactivity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Retroactivity is
either “true” or “quasi.” Id. True retroactivity “consists in the application of a
new rule of law to an act or transaction which was completed before the rule
was promulgated.” Id. Quasi-retroactivity “occurs when a new rule of law is
applied to an act or transaction in the process of completion.” Id.
134. This standard was established by Article 28 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, which states:
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act
or fact which too place or any situation which ceased to exists before
the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that par-
ty.
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ing of the UNESCO Convention were dissatisfied with such a
provision, or lack thereof, largely because they believed that
cultural heritage looted before the effective date of the
UNESCO Convention should have been available to them for
recovery.135 Other States, including the United States, felt that
retroactivity should not be present in the UNESCO Convention
and made this understanding a key provision to ratifying the
treaty.136 This sentiment pertains mainly to market nations
and nations with a long history of colonial and noncolonial
plunder, such as the United Kingdom, which is especially op-
posed to this day to the return of many objects in its posses-
sion.137
The lack of the retroactive application of the UNESCO Con-
vention has been described as one of its many shortcomings.138
Yet there is nothing in the text of the UNESCO Convention it-
self that prevents a retroactive application. 139 Technically
speaking, retroactivity can be read into the UNESCO Conven-
Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 155 U.N.T.S. 331,
8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Conven-
tion]. For a general discussion of how retroactive application of treaties can
be read into a convention, see William A. Schabas, Retroactive Application of
the Genocide Convention, 4 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 36 (2010).
135. O’KEEFE, supra note 28, at 14. Many of these States were source na-
tions coming out of an era of colonialism and the UNESCO Convention was a
crucial protective measure in their view. Lyndel Prott, The Ethics and Law of
Returns, 61 MUSEUM INT’L 101, 103–04 (2009).
136. See the Six Understandings, supra note 83.
137. The most notorious example of this attitude is the never-ending battle
between the British Museum and Greece over the Elgin Marbles, which were
previously removed from the Parthenon in Athens. See Ian Johnston, British
Museum Offers to Lend Elgin Marbles Back to Greece, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 27,
2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/british-museum-
offers-to-lend-elgin-marbles-back-to-greece-10140267.html. In March 2015,
the United Kingdom refused to join U.N. mediation proceedings over the
ownership of the Marbles and offered to lend the Marbles to the Greeks,
claiming the objects were legally obtained by Lord Elgin. Id.
138. Vitale, supra note 36, at 1842. Other major critiques include the
“clumsiness” of the final text of the UNESCO Convention, limitations im-
posed on it by national legislative efforts to apply the UNESCO Convention,
and “the need for claims to show an established legal link with the object be-
ing claimed in another country” in private law. See Prott, supra note 64, at 4.
139. Retroactivity is not explicitly mentioned in the text of the UNESCO
Convention nor is it explicitly prevented. See 1970 UNESCO Convention,
supra note 23. Rather, retroactivity is understood as nonoccurring under the
standards of the Convention. See supra note 134.
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tion through a provision of a member State’s domestic law en-
forcing the UNESCO Convention.140 A State can also indicate
its intent to apply a given treaty retroactively at the time of
signing. 141 In fact, Article 15 of the UNESCO Convention
“makes clear the obvious point that nothing in the Convention
prevents the parties from going beyond its terms and restoring
cultural property previously removed from another party’s ter-
ritory.”142
Retroactivity matters in questions regarding timing of export
and import, hence “the enactment date of a national ownership
law or an international or bilateral agreement is significant in
determining legal ownership of cultural property.”143 This is
well illustrated in the Canadian case of R v. Heller.144 In 1981,
Ben Heller, a New York-based art dealer, imported a Nigerian
Nok terracotta sculpture into Canada.145 The sculpture was il-
legally removed from Nigeria, and both Canada146 and Nigeria
were parties to the UNESCO Convention at the time the sculp-
ture was imported.147 Nigeria, however, had made it illegal to
140. If the domestic legislation allows retroactivity, common sense dictates
that nothing really prevents a convention from functioning in this way
141. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 33 (2001).
142. Bator, supra note 49, at 378. See also 1970 UNESCO Convention, su-
pra note 23, art. 15.
143. Provenance Guide, INT’L FOUND. FOR ART RES.,
http://www.ifar.org/provenance_guide.php (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
144. R v. Heller (1983), 27 Alta. L.R. 2d, 346 (Can. Alta. Prov. Ct.).
145. Id. paras. 1–2.
146. Canada implemented the UNESCO Convention in 1985 through its
Cultural Property Export and Import Act (CPEIA). R.S.C. 1985, c. C-51
(Can.). For the text of the CPEIA, see Cultural Property Export and Import
Act, GOV’T OFCAN., JUST. LS. WEBSITE, http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-
51/ (last updated Nov. 5, 2015). Canada’s primary focus was on Article 3 of
the UNESCO Convention, which not only controls imports of cultural herit-
age into the country but also helps protect Canada’s own heritage and its
illegal export. Patty Gerstenblith, Expert Report for Participants in the Sec-
ond Meeting of States Parties to the 1970 Convention: United States of Ameri-
ca and Canada 6 (June 20, 2012),
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/pdf/Gerstenbli
th_en.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2015). One important distinction between the
CPEIA and the United States’ CPIA is that Canada does not require specific
designation of an object in the way the CPIA does, giving the CPEIA broader
application. Id. at 12.
147. See Heller (1983), 27 Alta. L.R. 2d, paras. 17–18. Canada implemented
the UNESCO Convention in 1977 and became a party to it in 1978. Id. Nige-
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export cultural antiquities as early as 1924.148 This made Hel-
ler’s importation illegal. However, it was unclear when the
sculpture was removed from Nigeria. 149 The key issue was
whether or not the Canadian legislature applying the UNESCO
Convention “intended to ban the import of cultural property
illegally exported from Nigeria at any time, or only that illegal-
ly exported after the entry into force of the legislation.”150 Pre-
siding Judge Stevenson resolved the quarry, stating “I am sat-
isfied that the meaning attached to the words ‘illegally export-
ed’ must be restricted to that time fame following the entry by
Canada as a party to the international convention.”151 The case
was dismissed and failed on subsequent appeal.152
Cases like Heller demonstrate that retroactivity does matter
and perhaps should be considered in the adjudication of cultur-
al heritage disputes. In the very least, such decisions suggest
that the concept of retroactivity can have a real impact on case
law and should not be dismissed completely, as it can have a
major impact on source nations’ ability to reembrace their lost
past.153
B. United States and Retroactivity of the UNESCO Convention
As previously mentioned, a nonretroactive UNESCO Conven-
tion was the only convention to which the United States was
willing to be a party.154 This stance is understandable from the
perspective of a major market country. Allowing retroactivity
to apply to the UNESCO Convention through the CPIA would
potentially mean that any source country could request the re-
turn of all its culturally significant objects currently in posses-
sion by American institutions and possibly even private collec-
ria ratified the UNESCO Convention in 1972. See 1970 Convention State Par-
ties supra note 40.
148. See Heller (1983), 27 Alta. L.R. 2d, para. 32.
149. Id. paras. 32–33. The court could only determine that the sculpture
was removed prior to 1977, but the exact date remains unknown. Id. para.54.
150. O’KEEFE, supra note 28, at 15.
151. See Heller (1983), 27 Alta L.R. 2d, para. 51.
152. R v. Heller (1984), 51 A.R. 73 (Can. Alta. C.A.).
153. However, both the Heller and Australian approaches are not without
problems primarily because “[r]equiring evidence that export occurred after
1970 and import after the date of local implementing legislation may there-
fore very severely limit the reach of the Convention.” O’KEEFE, supra note 28,
at 17.
154. See the Six Understandings, supra note 83.
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tions. This seems like an unthinkable proposition, because it
equates to severe economic losses.155 Cultural heritage is price-
less only in theory; in practice, it is the source of great revenue
for those involved in its illegal trade.
In a culture of free market economy, any limitation on goods is
detrimental, even if those goods are of questionable provenance
and even more questionable procurement.156 Some of the strong-
est opponents to repatriation come from the museum community
itself, notably the Getty Museum,157 since they are likely to be the
most seriously affected by such a retroactive law. This cultural
internationalism position prompted the United States to not only
provide its own drafts of the UNESCO Convention but also to
adopt only two articles of the Convention through the CPIA.158
Interested in participating, seemingly to obtain the result it de-
sired, the United States ensured that the burden would not fall on
importing countries like itself when it came to curbing the illegal
art trade.159 As a result, “[t]he resulting Convention imposes the
primary duty to prevent illicit traffic in cultural heritage in the
developing exporting states rather than the developed importing
states such as the United States.”160 A lax application of the
155. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe estimates that
as much as $6 billion worth of stolen antiquities are traded globally each
year. Report of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development, at para.
55, EUR. PARL. DOC. 9018 (Apr. 6, 2001), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-
ViewHTML.asp?FileID=9242&lang=EN (last visited Sept. 24, 2015). The FBI
also found that this figure was accurate, adding that “[w]orldwide, only five
percent to ten percent of artwork reported stolen is recovered.” New FBI Task
Force on Art Theft Hopes to Learn About Global Trade From Professionals in
Art, Museum Worlds, 5 WORLD TRADE REV., Feb. 2005 (Muhammad Saeed
ed.), available at
http://worldtradereview.com/news.asp?pType=N&iType=A&iID=100&siD=9&
nID=19344&pPage=Y (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
156. See generally Pearlstein, supra note 72.
157. See, e.g., James Cuno, Culture War: The Case Against Repatriating
Museum Artifacts, FOREIGN AFF.,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142185/james-cuno/culture-war (last
visited Sept. 24, 2015). Lacking a central cohesive argument, this sentiment
is found less and less often among museum directors as a result of recent
strides toward developing friendlier and speedier exchanges and returns be-
tween American Museums and source nations.
158. See Jowers, supra note 34.
159. VRDOLJAK, supra note 83, at 243.
160. Forrest, supra note 106, at 611.
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UNESCO Convention also supported the United States’ “aversion
to the enforcement of foreign laws by its domestic courts”161 and
allowed for the assertion of “the values of both preservation and
free trade.”162 Collectively, these measures ensured that an active
market in illegal antiquities would continue to thrive.
Theoretically, the nonretroactive approach prevents a possi-
ble flood of repatriation requests. In reality the United States,
through the CPIA, limits the requests themselves to coopera-
tion with only MOU countries leaving those source countries
without agreements with no recourse.163 There appears to be no
real danger for a potential Pandora’s box effect of repatriation.
The current situation neither suggests that this would occur
nor has there been any sign of such a flood of requests in the
years since the adoption of the UNESCO Convention.
C. Australia and Retroactivity of the UNESCO Convention
Australian and American acceptance of the UNESCO Con-
vention and its implementation through their respective do-
mestic legislation highlights different approaches to the illegal
antiquities market. Generally speaking, “Australia has not
been a prominent importing state, and few requests have been
received from other states for the return of their cultural herit-
age.”164 The Australian illicit art and antiquities market has
also not been well studied until recent years.165 Additionally,
Australia may also be considered more as a source country
since there seems to be a growing interest in the cultural arti-
161. VRDOLJAK, supra note 83, at 243. This sentiment reflects the attitude
of the United States at the time of the drafting.
162. Barbara B. Rosencrance, Note, Harmonious Meeting: The McClain De-
cision and the Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
311, 313 (1986).
163. See 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(2)(A)–(B).
164. Forrest, supra note 106, at 617.
165. For example, a 2000 report exploring Australia’s illegal art market was
“a first exploration of the place of illegality in the art market of Australia.”
Kenneth Polk et al., An Exploration of the Illegal Art Market of Australia 1
(2000), http://www.criminologyresearchcouncil.gov.au/reports/8-98-9.pdf.
Australia was “introduced” to the illegal trafficking in archaeological com-
modities from the Middle East, for example, through its involvement in the
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and has witnessed an increase in the im-
portation of these commodities due to immense looting in these war-torn
countries. Forrest, supra note 106, at 608–609.
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facts of its Aboriginal population.166 These factors make Aus-
tralia somewhat unique and may be the explanation for its
slightly broader understanding of the UNESCO Convention
with respect to the Convention’s retroactive application.
Although Australia did not adopt a fully retroactive approach to
the UNESCO Convention through the PMCHA, this legislation is
more inclusive than the CPIA. Through the PMCHA, Australia
understands the UNESCO Convention as applying “to objects im-
ported after 1 July 1987, but which were previously exported from
another country at any time where there was a cultural heritage
protection law in force, contrary to the provision of that law.”167
Specifically, Section 14 of the PMCA does not have a “cut-off date
for the illegal export from the exporting state . . . and it does not
matter that the export took place prior to the PMCHA coming in-
to force.”168 Hence unlike the CPIA, the PMCHA does not require
that agreements be made between a source nation and Australia
in order for the PMCHA to apply. This gives countries that may
not be parties to the UNESCO Convention the chance to seek the
restitution of their cultural property, which is not possible under
the CPIA.169
It is worth noting that the nonretroactivity of the UNESCO
Convention under the U.S. CPIA and similar foreign legislation
may be a hindrance to Australian attempts in recovering its
own cultural heritage.170 Truly ironic is the fact that “[t]hough
Australian indigenous material would be recognized under
these [the CPIA] definitions, the kind of items described in the
166. Aboriginal art is particularly popular among collectors in England,
North America, and Europe. Polk et al., supra note 170, at 21. Aboriginal art
is also “a major component of Australian art, especially in terms of its over-
seas market.” Id. at 16. In the United States, the trade in Native American
artifacts is also very active, and indigenous groups constantly battle for re-
turns. See, e.g., Farida Jhabvala Romero, Lake Country Cracks Down on
Looting of Native American Artifacts, KQED NEWS (Sept. 21, 2015),
http://ww2.kqed.org/news/2015/09/21/lake-county-cracks-down-on-looting-of-
native-american-artifacts.
167. O’KEEFE, supra note 28, at 17 (quoting JOHN F. LEY, AUSTRALIA’S
PROTECTION OFMOVABLE CULTURALHERITAGE 125 (1991).
168. Forrest, supra note 106, at 619–20.
169. Id. at 620.
170. Linda Young, Australian and International Laws on Export Controls
for Cultural Heritage 7 (1999),
http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/conferences/artcrime/young.pdf (last
visited Sept. 24, 2015)
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most recent Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage permit
list . . . would not be recognised.”171 This, once again, only un-
derlines the need for uniformity in both implementing legisla-
tion and definitions within those laws. As it currently stands,
certain cultural objects may be excluded due to semantics and
it is largely due to the fact that the text of the UNESCO Con-
vention allows State Parties great latitude in the implementa-
tion of its provisions.172
III. TOWARD A RESOLUTION
The UNESCO Convention has proven useful despite its many
limitations, mostly in the areas of inspiring the international
community to think about cultural heritage seriously and lead-
ing the way for the creation of other international instruments
that now protect a wide variety of “heritage.” This section ex-
plores the ways in which the UNESCO Convention may yet be
salvaged and suggests solutions to broadening the scope of pro-
tection through the use of diplomacy and creative legislation.
A. “Quick Fixes” to the UNESCO Convention’s Limitations
Cultural heritage is not a static concept, therefore the main
international instrument dedicated to its protection, the
UNESCO Convention, should also be flexible and amenable to
change. In order to address the issues surrounding the imple-
mentation of the UNESCO Convention, the most obvious sug-
gestion is amending the UNESCO Convention itself.173 One so-
lution would be making the UNESCO Convention apply retro-
actively as a whole. However, this would be an unusual step to
take because it would directly oppose the standards promulgat-
ed by the Vienna Convention.174 Furthermore, Article 25 of the
UNESCO Convention provides that though the Convention
171. Id. at 8.
172. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 23, arts. 5–14.
173. Recent suggestions for resolving the UNESCO Convention’s inadequacy
include drafting an entirely new convention based both on the UNESCO
Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. Zsuzsanna Veres, Note,
The Fight Against Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Property: The 1970 UNESCO
Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L.
91, 111–13 (2014). This hypothetical convention would include the most suc-
cessful provisions of both Conventions and additional provisions aimed at
bolstering the international scope of cultural heritage protection. Id.
174. See Vienna Convention, supra note 134, art. 28.
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may be revised, it will “bind only the States which shall become
Parties to the revising convention.”175 Amending the UNESCO
Convention would be a cumbersome process, since a new set of
signatories would be needed, and some nations may not agree
with such a revision.
Another solution is the amendment of a particular Article in
the UNESCO Convention. One suggestion has been to revise
Article 7 to include any party or person, both private and pub-
lic, rather than only institutions. 176 This would require the
United States to apply the Article not only to nationally con-
trolled entities as it does presently, but to all institutions.177
Furthermore, if Article 7 was amended to apply retroactively it
would become possible for source nations to request the return
of their cultural heritage exported pre-1970.178 The success of
such an amendment is questionable, as any amendment to the
UNESCO Convention would necessitate the cooperation of the
entire international community.
Alternatively, the United States could amend the CPIA to in-
clude provisions similar to those of Australia’s PMCHA. Specif-
ically, countries that are not parties to the UNESCO Conven-
tion and countries without MOUs with the United States could
be granted protection under the CPIA. Nothing prevents the
United States from broadening the scope of the CPIA as it cur-
rently stands. In fact, if the American approach became more
open and dedicated to full international cooperation, other na-
tions may follow suit.179 Coupled with the changing attitudes
among American museums toward genial repatriation, a truly
international movement would surface.180
One reason the CPIA was constructed to limit repatriation
returns could be the existence of the NSPA. Since the NSPA
175. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 23, art. 25.
176. John P. Shinn, A New World Order for Cultural Property: Addressing
the Failure of International and Domestic Regulation of the International Art
Market, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 977, 1001 (1994).
177. See 118 CONG. REC. 27, 925 (1972).
178. Shinn, supra note 176.
179. One scholar has noted that “the United Nations, and by extension
UNESCO, is virtually a useless body without the active participation of the
United States of America.” Id. at 998. Therefore, a rededication of the United
States to its commitments toward the UNESCO Convention could signal a
new era in the war against illicit exportation of cultural heritage worldwide.
Id.
180. See generally Seiff, supra note 3.
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recognizes vesting patrimony laws, perhaps it seemed unneces-
sary to extend the CPIA to resemble the PMCHA.181 The NSPA
also covers a much wider category of cultural heritage.182 In
some ways, the NSPA is the better vehicle for repatriation than
the CPIA. The NSPA can also be applied retroactively to for-
eign patrimony laws and renders illegal the possession of “cul-
tural property that may have been in the United States for
years . . . illegal, whether or not such items were legally im-
ported into the United States.”183 Perhaps the United States
did not insert similar provisions into the CPIA because they
already existed in the NSPA, and providing a double layer of
protection would undermine the future security of past cultural
imports.184 To prevent this, awareness should be raised as to
the benefits offered by the UNESCO Convention and states not
currently parties to it should be encouraged to sign. This is sig-
nificant because the UNESCO Convention requires that na-
tions pass legislation that comports to the provisions of the
treaty.185 The result could be very beneficial because countries
could effectively strengthen their current import and export
laws dealing with cultural heritage.
Another approach to retroactivity could be the stipulation of
retroactive application “to regulate certain situations that without
it would be against the law.”186 How this would play out in the
cultural heritage scenario is dubious however, since it could po-
tentially open the doors to claims that would otherwise remain
untouched. Furthermore, a solution may be gleamed from the
UNIDROIT Convention, which stipulates that member states im-
181. The “NSPA protect[s] any foreign state’s cultural property––not just
the cultural property of those states parties to the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion––as long as a court determines that the state has enacted a valid patri-
mony law.” See Vitale, supra note 36, at 1859.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1861.
184. However, applying the NSPA undermines “the effectiveness of [the]
CPIA, which in turn hinders the United States’ ability to fulfill its obligations
under international law.” Id. at 1862.
185. Id. at 1870.
186. João Grandino Rodas, The Doctrine of Non-Retroactivity of Interna-
tional Treaties, 68 REVISTA DE FACULDADE DE DIREITO, UNIVERSIDADE DE SÃO
PAULO 341, 346 (1973) (exploring the core of the retroactivity concept and
debating the issue on a philosophical level with some creative suggestions for
why a nation may choose to implement treaties nonretroactively or retroac-
tively).
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plement all of the treaty provisions instead of choosing which ones
they want to adopt.187 The lacking requirement of the implemen-
tation of all treaty provisions is a very real problem with the
UNESCO Convention. For example, the previously mentioned
Articles 3 and 6 are truly meant to be understood in conjunction
and together have a real force between them. If one State Party
chooses not to implement both Articles and another State Party
adopts both, there arises a real discrepancy in uniformity and the
uniformity of application is what the UNESCO Convention has
suffered from the most.188 Ultimately, the “Convention fails to
promote adherence to a uniform set of laws; rather, it permits in-
dividual states to maintain their own import and export regula-
tions as well as laws regarding restitution of stolen property.”189
This however harks back to the problem of participation discussed
earlier; states may be reluctant to become signatories to a conven-
tion that requires acquiescence to all enumerated provisions.
A very real problem, which is not often discussed by critics of
the UNESCO Convention’s lack of retroactivity, is the concern
pertaining to the impact on the rights of property holders and
the possible human rights and constitutional issues that could
arise.190 These types of repercussions have the potential to dis-
courage states from becoming parties to the UNESCO Conven-
tion or encourage other states to opt to leave. Because cultural
heritage is so deeply connected to a human component, it is
important that heritage protection is enforced while still being
187. Alexandra Love Levine, The Need for Uniform Legal Protection Against
Cultural Property Theft: A Final Cry For the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, 36
BROOK. J. INT’L L.751, 762 (2011). Additionally, Article 18 of the UNIDROIT
Convention states, “No reservations are permitted except those expressly
authorized in this Convention,” and this further ensures that the UNIDROIT
Convention is implemented as intended. International Institute for the Unifi-
cation of Private Law Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects, June 24, 1995, 2421 U.N.T.S. 457, 34 I.L.M. 1322, 8 A.J.I.C.L. 239
[hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention]. The UNESCO Convention, on the other
hand, allows member states to more narrowly tailor how they will apply the
treaty. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 23, arts. 5–14.
188. Jennifer H. Lehman, The Continued Struggle with Stolen Cultural
Property: The Hague Convention, the UNESCO Convention and the
UNIDROIT Draft Convention, 14 ARIZ. J. INT’L&COMP. L. 527, 543 (1997).
189. Spencer A. Kinderman, Comment, The UNIDROIT Draft Convention
on Cultural Objects: An Examination of the Need for a Uniform Legal
Framework for Controlling the Illicit Movement of Cultural Property, 7 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 457, 470 (1993).
190. FORREST, supra note 26, at 41.
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respectful to the human element of the equation. Both tangible
and intangible cultural heritage and cultural property shape
individual and group identities.191 Where cultural heritage can
impact human rights is the murky area where cultures clash.
One can see this being especially true in areas where more
than one distinct cultural group can be seen living side by
side. 192 Because cultural “heritage is also intertwined with
identity and territory, where individuals and communities are
often in competition or outright conflict”193 it is not unusual
that “[c]onflicts may occur . . . between ethnic minorities and
dominant majorities disputing the right to define and manage
the cultural heritage of the minority.”194 This problem of own-
ership is the same problem the UNESCO Convention addresses
on an international scale, where the part of the minority group
is played by source nations and the part of the majority group
is played by market nations.195 How such violations would be
resolved is problematic on its own because the international
community would not be quick to give them the same status
and gravity as say, violations of political and civil rights.196
191. CULTURAL HERITAGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (Helaine Silverman & D.
Fairchild Ruggles eds., 2007). Heritage is generally seen as something that
has positive value and as such benefits all people because it a “shared com-
mon good.” Id.
192. Interestingly, this phenomenon can be seen in Australia, where indig-
enous peoples still clash with the majority population and this case be also
seen in the realm of cultural heritage protection. For information on the offi-
cial policy for protecting indigenous culture, see AUSTL. GOV’T ATTORNEY
GEN’S DEP’T, Australian Government’s Policy on Indigenous Repatriation 4
(Oct. 10, 2013),
http://arts.gov.au/sites/default/files/indigenous/repatriation/Repatriation%20
Policy_10%20Oct%202013.pdf.
193. CULTURALHERITAGE ANDHUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 191.
194. Id.
195. Id. According to Silverman and Ruggles,
The inherent conflict between world and national heritage and indi-
vidual or local rights emerges at this critical point. Heritage is by no
means a neutral category of self-definition not an inherently positive
thing: It is a concept that can promote self-knowledge, facilitate
communication and learning, and guide stewardship of the present
culture and its historical past. But it can also be a tool for oppres-
sion. For this reason, heritage has an uneasy place in the United Na-
tions’ call for universal human rights and it merits examination as
an urgent contemporary problem.
Id.
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Since the UNESCO Convention is a widely recognized inter-
national instrument and has proven to be a rather problematic
one over the years,197 the United States should feel certain that
if the UNESCO Convention ever becomes retroactive, its effects
would still not be far reaching enough to cause a major decline
of the illegal antiquities market due to the sheer volume of this
market itself, and the continued attractiveness of art and an-
cient art as collectibles. In fact, the illicit art and antiquities
market seems to be growing as a result of armed conflicts
around the world.198 Without the cooperation of both market
nations and source nations, the UNESCO Convention will re-
main largely underutilized.
B. Approaching a Realistic Solution
There can be no “quick” fix to the current limitations imposed
by the UNESCO Convention and such an approach would dis-
courage rather than encourage nations from participating in a
comity-driven repatriation process. It is clear from the discus-
sion above that amending the UNESCO Convention may not be
a viable option and the promotion of additional MOUs, alt-
hough a positive start, is a slow-moving process. Many source
nations simply do not have the resources to play the waiting
game while their cultural heritage continues to be looted, de-
stroyed, and sold.
The first step towards a workable solution is to promote uni-
formity among the many national laws implementing the
UNESCO Convention. Ironically, international agreements usu-
ally aim to promote such uniformity, and the UNESCO Conven-
tion would benefit from a reformulation in the fashion of the
UNIDROIT Convention.199 When a convention must be adopted
196. How human rights intersect with cultural rights in a particular con-
text and why such rights may not be given the same treatment as primary
political and civil rights of is a problem first faced by proponents of economic,
social, and cultural rights since they surfaced in the post-Cold War era. For a
general discussion of this dichotomy and how it developed in international
human rights law, see Theo van Boven, Categories of Rights, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 143–56 (Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah
& Sandesh Sivakumaran eds., 2d ed. 2014).
197. See generally Prott, supra note 64, at 4.
198. For a general discussion of the effect of war on the illicit market, see
Seiff, supra note 3, at 35.
199. See Levine, supra note 187.
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in its full form, there will be a higher degree of consistency in
the domestic legislature that implements that convention. 200
Uniformity of the legal framework of repatriation has the poten-
tial of promoting a more even, comity-driven process and has the
potential of creating a real opportunity for the consideration of
equitable retroactive returns. In addition, uniformity in legisla-
tion will be more beneficial to source nations that simply may
not have the resources to navigate complicated legal frameworks
where no predictability of outcome exists.201
Should the United States choose to provide easier routes for
source nations to regain their looted pasts, it could not only set
the example for other market nations but also establish valua-
ble relationships with other source countries.202 This in turn,
could lead to the opening of new legal paths for the exchange of
cultural heritage and the establishment and nurturing of in-
ternational economic opportunities for all parties involved. For
source nations looking to cement their futures through looking
to the past, this would provide an easier solution to a major di-
lemma. For these reasons, the United States should consider
extending MOU agreements to those nations currently making
frequent repatriation requests that are not currently parties to
any such agreement with the United States in the spirit of in-
ternational comity and recognition of the importance of the
value of cultural heritage worldwide.
The best solution can be gleamed from a combination of the
above mentioned “quick fix” solutions—one that is tailored in a
such a way as to not undermine the source nations, while mak-
200. It is important to note the distinction between ownership laws and
export laws, which often for political reasons, remain largely muddled and
create additional difficulties by creating “escape clauses.” Lauren Henderson,
The Duryodhana Dilemma: United States v. A 10th Century Cambodian
Sandstone Sculpture and a Proposed Code of Ethics-Based Response to Repat-
riation Requests for Auction Houses, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 249, 271 (2014). It is
worth considering that if a uniform code of ethics helps auction houses and
museums avoid repatriation claims, a similar uniformity in legislation may
benefit nations subject to repatriation claims as well. This may be a good
starting point for the United States to address its fears of retroactive repatri-
ation claims. For an enlightened discussion of this problem and how it applies
to museums and auction houses, see generally Id.
201. However, the question of whether or not nations would even be willing
to conform to such a proposition raises an entire issue of its own.
202. The example of Australia and India discussed in the beginning of this
Note underlines this very idea. See Bourke, supra note 1.
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ing sure that market nations are able to obtain artifacts in a
respectful and legal manner. In theory, each state party will
still be able to somewhat create the legal framework for their
respective country’s situation. A key ingredient in achieving a
more structured and uniform repatriation process must be the
adoption of more uniform domestic and national legislation by
state parties to the UNESCO Convention that implement Con-
vention’s provisions. This should be the main focus for reform
in the United States, because such reform would prove highly
beneficial to international relations and aid in crafting a better
long-term solution to the problem of cultural heritage protec-
tion. What is certain is that the time to act is now; the longer
the United States waits to correct and address some of the
shortcomings of its current repatriation regime, the more diffi-
cult it will become to renegotiate its terms.
CONCLUSION
While the UNESCO Convention introduced a standard for
the protection of cultural heritage within international law,
this ambitious goal has yet to be achieved in the years since its
implementation.203 The UNESCO Convention suffers from its
lack of retroactive application provisions, which limits its tem-
poral reach. Furthermore, it does not encourage uniformity of
law since State parties are allowed to choose which provisions
they adopt and how they adapt those provisions to their na-
tional legislation. 204 Nevertheless, one cannot overlook the
UNESCO Convention’s impact, for it was the start of a truly
international movement to protect cultural heritage.
Ultimately, the solution may lie with the State Parties them-
selves. After all, the efficacy of the UNESCO Convention de-
pends heavily on the “reciprocity offered by its members.”205
National governments have the real power to implement
changes in their cultural heritage policies and have more tools
now than ever before to form and implement such policies ef-
fectively.206 There is need for global cooperation and this can be
203. Prott, supra note 64, at 4.
204. See Kinderman, supra note 189.
205. Simpson, supra note 117.
206. Today, nations around the globe have the benefit of UNESCO’s guiding
hand more than ever with a number of conventions tailored to particular cul-
tural heritage protection needs. See Culture: Themes UNESCO,
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
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seen in the culmination of the conferences on the protection of
endangered heritage of Syria and Iraq.207
In many ways, the UNESCO Convention is very much a prod-
uct of its time. Today, public opinion strongly supports both the
protection of cultural heritage and repatriation, which is increas-
ingly reflected through state and institutional cooperation in arti-
fact repatriation. In many ways then “[t]he non-retrospective na-
ture of the Convention therefore acts to distinguish between two
eras in relation to the illicit trafficking of cultural heritage: pre
and post entry into force of the 1970 Convention.”208 This public
support may be the key to implementing lasting changes in the
future of cultural heritage law. As the illicit trading of cultural
heritage continues to grow, the inadequacies of the current sys-
tem of protection will become more apparent, and the need for a
complete and uniform system will come to the forefront. Large
market nations like the United States have a real opportunity to
lead the way in the new wave of cultural protection laws, and the
legacy and founding intentions of the UNESCO Convention may
yet be redeemed.
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207. This truly international endeavor brought together scholars and ex-
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